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BASIC  CONCEPTS
Reinsurance  is a mechanism used by the insurance industry to spread the risks it assumes from policyhold-
ers.  Through it, the industry's  losses are absorbed and distributed among a group of companies so that no single
company is overburdened with the financial responsibility of offering coverage to its policyholders.  Catastrophes,
unexpected liabilities, and a series of large losses that might be too great for an individual insurer to absorb are able
to be handled through reinsurance. Without reinsurance, most insurers would be able to cover only the safest of ven-
tures, leaving many risky but worthwhile ventures without coverage.
Insurance,  Reinsurance,  and  Retrocessions
Reins  u  ra  ct
/Insurance  Cotracts\
t  .Rlss  .)  .:Risks.  .)  (Rik.J
A reinsurance  contract is essentially an insurance policy issued by one company  -the  assuming insurer
or reinsurer  - to another company,  usually called the ceding  company,  primary  carrier,  or the direct  un-
derwriter.  The ceding company is the insurer that underwrites the policy initially, and then later shifts part or all
of the liability for coverage to a reinsurer by purchasing reinsurance. This reinsurance provides reimbursement to the
ceding insurer for claims payments covered by the reinsurance agreement.  It does not alter the underlying reinsured
policies  or the obligations  created by those policies.  However, it does provide protection to the ceding insurer
against frequent or severe losses.  Nonetheless, the ceding company remains obligated to pay policyholder claims
without regard to its reinsurer's  performance or financial condition.  Typically, the policyholder has no direct claim
on the reinsurer - i.e., the policyholder does not "look through" to the reinsurer as the source of indemnification.I
IThere is currently some debate over the "look through" treatment  of reinsurance. When insolvency  of an insurer
occurs, claimants of the insolvent company  may wish to be able to collect directly from the reinsurer  rather than
see the payments from the reinsurer  in respect of their claims become  part of the pool of assets of the failed com-
pany that will be distributed  among all its creditors. Claimants  feel they should have a first call on those reinsur-
ance payments since they are occasioned by their claims. This is particularly true of professional  risk managers
working with very large risks, who may insist on a "look through" agreement  with assent on the quality of reinsur-
ers.  For example, he may want to insure a building for $7 million, but is aware that the insurer has capacity for
only $5 million.  He also knows that the additional coverage will be obtained through "facultative reinsurance"
(discussed  later), that the facultative reinsurance  will apply specifically  to his building and no others, and that he
will be paying for this facultative reinsurance  as part of his premiums. Asking for a "look through" clause would
seem to be a wise thing to do.  In some countries,  all such "look through requests"  have been denied by the Courts.
In response to such denials, some insurance clients have used an alternative  mcchanism  that has similar effects by
arranging for an "assignment"  of reinsurance  proceeds  in favor of the ultimate beneficiaries. Insurance  regulators
have found that "look through" agreements  and "assignments"  pose serious questions of equity in the event of an
insolvency.  Instead of  payments going to the insolvent firm, to be  distributed equitably among the  firm's
- Page I -The quantity of insurance ceded to a reinsurer is called the cession.  If more of the risk is shifted to the rein-
surer than it desires, the reinsurer may in turn reinsure with yet another reinsurer a portion of the risk.  This reinsur-
ance purchased by reinsurers is known as retrocesslons.  The retrocession of risks often proceeds in a chain-like
fashion, spreading exposure to risks throughout the international reinsurance community.
PURPOSES  FOR  REINSURANCE
A reinsurer, like any other commercial enterprise, is desirous of making a profit.  It will price its contracts ac-
cordingly.  Therefore, if a primary carrier buys reinsurance, presumably it is doing so by sacrificing some of its ex-
pected profits to the reinsurer.  Why would it willingly do so?  There are four reasons from the primary carrier's
point of view:
1) Reinsurance enlarges the primary carrier's underwriting capacity
2)  Reinsurance stabilizes the primary carrier's earnings and smoothes the fluctuations in loss ratios
3)  Reinsurance reduces the primary carrier's unearned  premium reserve requirement
4)  Reinsurance creates a mechanism for the primary carrier to exit a particular segment of business
In addition, reinsurance provides some advantages in the broader economy-wide context:
5)  It facilitates the geographic and intertemporal diversification of risks
6)  It leverages the specific expertise of reinsurers in underwriting/pricing risks, particularly for non-
standard risks (e.g., nuclear power plants, etc.)
7)  It signals to customers and regulators the acceptance of the primary insurer's  underwriting
standards by a major international reinsurer
Below we will briefly elaborate on the first four of these purposes, which relate to the primary carrier's point
of view.
Underwriting Capacity
The amount of business an insurer can underwrite is known as the insurer's  capacity.  This capacity is lim-
ited by a myriad of factors, but among the most important are the level of net equity2 held by the insurer and the na-
ture of its business.  Some risks are too large for a given insurer to assume by itself, either because it is not permit-
ted to do so or because it would be imprudent.  Moreover, there is a level of aggregate risks, beyond which the capac-
ity of the insurer is strained due to its limited net equity.  Nonetheless, the insurer may underwrite these risk, know-
ing that it can pass along to reinsurers that part of the risks which it does not wish to retain.  Thus, the insurer can
acquire an interest in business that otherwise would not be available, and the consumer receives the convenience of
being able to cover his or her insurance needs through a single company.
Earnings  Stability
Insurance has always been a business characterized by variability in the frequency and severity of claims, year
by year, particularly the propertyAiability sector.  One of the contributing factors to this variability is the nature of
risks assumed by insurers.  When a natural catastrophe strikes, an adverse social or economic condition occurs, or a
legal interpretation of liability changes or expands, massive losses can be generated.  To the extent that the responsi-
bility for indemnifying losses is shared via reinsurance among many insurers, loss exposure is diversified and loss ra-
tios are stabilized.  This is particularly true with excess of loss reinsurance, wherein a reinsurer assumes liability for
losses that exceed some normal threshold. In this case, the reinsurer absorbs much of the variability of underwriting
losses, leaving the primary carrier with a smoother pattern of loss ratios over time.
claimants,  they are channeled  directly  to a favored  few of the firm's clients who arranged to have "look through" or
"assignment" provisions in their insurance policies.  However, for some emerging countries facing very large
risks, such provisions may be justified in order to develop commerce. Further discussion of this controversy is
provided  in the NAC Reinsurance  Corporation's booklet  entitled Reinsurance  Contracts: Content  and Regulation,
pp.  38-4  1.
21n this Primer, we will use the term "net equity" to be the combination  of paid in capital, shareholders' surplus,
policyholders'  surplus, subordinated  debt, and surplus  notes. This net equity serves as an important  buffer to cover
claims in the current and future years beyond those provided  for in the insurance  reserves. It should  be of sufficient
size to reduce  the probability  of ruin to a very small amount. See Stone [19731  for a discussion  of capacity.
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In many countries,  the expenses  associated  with issuing  an insurance  policy, such as agent  commissions,  ad-
ministrative  expenses,  and taxes are charged  against  a company's  current income,  rather  than amortized  over  the ex-
pected  life of the policy. This results  in a reduction  of net equity. Moreover,  the insurance  premium  does not flow
through  to the bottom  line but is held in an unearned  premium  reserve  (sometimes  called "the reserve  for unexpired
risks"),  to be released  over time  rather  than  fully recognized  as an asset at the outset,  thereby  exacerbating  the net eq-
uity situation. The more  rapidly an insurer  grows,  the greater  the drain on net equity, and capacity  to write further
business  is diminished.
Reinsurance  is able to remedy  this situation  somewhat,  because  a ceding insurer shares  its expenses with its
reinsurer.  Indeed, the reinsurer will typically  give the ceding insurer a ceding commission to reimburse it for
expenses  associated  with  writing  the business  being  reinsured. The ceding  commission  can then  be added  directly  to
the ceding  company's  net equity. Because  ceding  commissions  are generally  considered  to be fully  earned when  paid,
they may immediately  increase  the net equity  of the primary  carrier. Moreover,  if certain  regulatory  requirements  di-
rected toward  promoting  insurer  solvency  have been  satisfied,  the primary  carrier  can generally  take a credit  for rein-
surance  on its accounting  statements. The primary  carrier  is in effect transferring  a block of business  to the reinsurer
along with  a corresponding  portion  of written  premiums. Hence,  the insurer's net written  premiums  are immediately
reduced. Thus, through reinsurance  the ceding company  can reduce its liabilities  and loss reserves attributable  to
them, and thereby  expand  its capacity  to write  new business.
A variety  of specialized  reinsurance  contracts  has  been  developed  specifically  to enhance  the reported  net equity
of ceding companies. Known as surplus  relief reinsurance, the contracts  differ from traditional reinsurance  in
that the latter  focuses on the transfer  of underwriting  risk, whereas  the former  concentrates  on the time value of
money  and caps the reinsurer's ultimate  financial  liability. Thus, the ceding company  is responsible  for paying all
losses  that exceed  the cap. If losses are in excess  of the cap, the reinsurer  may pay them,  but receive  reimbursement
from the ceding company  in ensuing  years. With surplus  relief  reinsurance,  the reinsurer  in effect lends a portion  of
its surplus to the ceding company, for which it charges a fee.  Surplus relief reinsurance  is sometimes;  abused,
wherein  virtually  no commercial  risk is transferred  to the reinsurer. 3
Mechanism to  Exit Business
Once an insurance  contract  has  been underwritten,  the responsibilities  of the insurer  can extend far into the fu-
ture. In the property/casualty  sector,  even when  the contracts  have  a short time  period of coverage,  it can take years
to discover a situation  that led to losses, and it can take even longer  before a claim is ultimately  settled. In the life
insurance  sector,  it is even more difficult  to exit  from the business  because  the contracts  are long term and noncan-
cellable. Therefore,  an insurer  becomes  wedded  to the old business,  even if over time it decides  to focus on other
lines  of business,  or to liquidate  its business  entirely. Liquidation  is often an especially  unattractive  option because
the insurer  forfeits  built-in  profits  that  otherwise  would  accrue  to its benefit. Reinsurance  proffers  an opportunity  for
a company  to disengage  from  certain lines  of business  or particular  insurance  contracts  when it is no longer deemed
in the strategic interests  of the insurer  to remain  with  them. Moreover,  it allows  a ceding company  to receive  some
benefit  from business  written  that would  be lost if the business  were simply  liquidated.  The liabilities  are transferred
to the reinsurer,  and the policyholder's  protection  continues. Thus, an insurer's foray into a field is not necessarily
an irrevocable  choice  when  reinsurance  markets  are strong  and active.
REINSURANCE  CONTRACTS
Methods  of  Cession
Three  methods  of ceding  risks  or policies  to a reinsurer  are by reinsurance  treaty,  by facultative  reinsurance,  or
by hybrid agreements. In a reinsurance  treaty, a reinsurer  will agree to assume the liabilities  associated with a
portion or all of the ceding company's  business for one or more specific lines of business (e.g., casualty, marine,
property)  and  the  reinsurer  is obligated  to reinsure  any  policies  the  company  issues  within  these  categories.
3Such contracts may be effected for the principal  purpose  of deceiving  regulators  as to the ceding  company's finan-
cial condition. Nonetheless,  the ceding company  shows increased  surplus  (i.e., net equity) on its balance sheet as a
result of purchasing  such reinsurance  and may appear to be safer as a result, even though the surplus  gained is not
really available to support the insurance risks absorbed  by the company. Additional  discussion  of these kinds of
contracts is provided  in the NAC Reinsurance  Corporation's  booklet entitled Reinsurance  Contracts: Content and
Regulation, pp. 36-40.
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tion of exposure, etc.  Reinsurance treaties generally remain in force for long periods of time and are easily renewed.
A reinsurer entering into a treaty typically will not review all of the individual risks being accepted; rather, it will
review the underwriting philosophy and standards of the ceding company as well as its historical experience.
In a facultative  reinsurance  agreement,  the ceding company cedes  the risks  associated  with  individual
policies to the reinsurer, but not for all policies within a given business line.  This kind of agreement is designed to
reduce the exposure of an insurer to losses associated with a given contract, but not for all contracts within a line of
business.  The reinsurer is free to accept or reject the cession and the terms are set on an ad hoc basis.  Facultative
reinsurance  is often used to cover catastrophic or unusual risk exposures.  A reinsurer entering into a facultative
agreement will typically expend substantial resources in examining the individual risks covered, because the contract
often exposes the reinsurer to substantial risk. Underwriting must be carefully done in order to ensure adequate pric-
ing.
Rather than enter into reinsurance on a contract-by-contract basis, a primary carrier and a reinsurer may enter
into an automatic  facultative  reinsurance agreement.  This kind of  arrangement,  encountered more frequently
in the life insurance business than in property/casualty lines, is actually a hybrid of treaty and facultative reinsurance.
Under this arrangement, a reinsurer accepts from a ceding company certain risks that conform to prespecified under-
writing guidelines.  The agreement may obligate the ceding company and reinsurer to share the conforming risks, or
it may allow them to select which risks to include and exclude.
Methods  of  Reinsurance  Cession
Types of Reinsurance  Contracts
Reinsurance  coverage  is structured  in two  broad forms: proportional  and nonproportional  contracts. Each of
these forms, in turn, has specialized  variations,  as shown  in the exhibit  on the page that  follows. In this Section  we
discuss  the forms  and  variations  for structuring  coverage  provided  by reinsurance  contracts.
Proportional Reinsurance
The earliest reinsurance  agreements  were almost invariably  made on a proportional  basis.  In proportional
reinsurance,  the ceding company and the reinsurer  share risks and premiums  on a proportional  basis of some sort.
Proportional  reinsurance  agreements  are used extensively  in property  insurance.  Two varieties  of proportional  rein-
surance  are in common  use  today  - quota share  and surplus  share.
Quota share agreements  are a type of proportional  reinsurance  that indemnifies  the ceding company for a
specified  percentage  of loss on each risk covered  in the agreement,  in return  for receipt  of a similar  percentage  of net
premium  paid to the ceding  company. These agreements  are the simplest  type of proportional  reinsurance,  because
each policy  is shared  in fixed  proportions.  Settlements  at the end of a quarter  can be determined  by applying  the pro-
portions to the aggregate  premiums  and aggregate  losses. The drawback  is that the ceding insurer will be left with
the same  proportion  of even the smallest  risks. They  can be administered  through  a treaty or on a facultative  basis.
If administered  through  a treaty,  the ceding  company  and  reinsurer  each share premiums  and responsibility  for losses
- Page 4 -on a fixed percentage basis for all policies in the covered classes that have been issued by the primary carrier.  If ad-
ministered through a facultative agreement, the sharing is similar, but on an individual risk rather than an entire line
of business.  This kind of contract can be particularly helpful to new, small firms that would otherwise have very
limited underwriting capacity.  An example of quota share agreements is where an insurer and reinsurer agree to split
premiums and losses equally on an entire line of business, such as auto physical damages.
l  PROPORTIONALTYPES OF REINSURANCEl
Reinsurer's  Participation  Predetermined 1 Rsinsurers  Participation  Depends  on  Size  of  Loss  and/or  a  Time  Event
Quta  Share:  Surplus  Share:  Per  Risk  Per  Occurrence  Aggregate  Stop  Loss:
Same  %  %  partidpation  Stop  Loss:  Reinsurer  participates
participation  varies  based  on  Reinsurer  participates  ver  a  predetermined
on  each  risk  type/size  over  a  predetermined  ggregate  limit  of  loss  for
of risk  amount  for  all  losses  collection  of  risks  over
arising  out  of  one  event  specified  period  of  time
or  occurrence
Per  Ris  k  Per  Risk  Aggregate
Excess  of  Loss:  Excess  of  Loss:
Reinsurer  participates  Reinsurer  participates
in  excess  of  a  pre-  wer  aggregate  claims
deterrnined  amount  'or  a risk  in  a  specified
perod  of  time
Adapted from a chart by Ronald E. Ferguson, "Bases of Reinsurance"
Surplus Share agreements are another type of proportional reinsurance.  With surplus share, a ceding com-
pany decides  what  level of liability it wishes  to retain on a given risk and then reinsures  multiples of  that level
through  the reinsurer.  For example, a ceding company may wish to retain a $100,000 liability for a given policy,
and by contract is allowed to cede up to 10 times its retention, or $1 million, to the reinsurer.  If the ceding com-
pany elects to retain more liability, it may cede the same multiple of its higher retention to reinsurers.  In a surplus
share agreement,  it is not unusual for there to be a maximum dollar limit on the  amount of liability  that can be
ceded to the reinsurer for any given risk. Administered primarily through treaty arrangements, the surplus share form
of risk sharing is more flexible than the quota share form.  It allows the ceding company to better manage its reten-
tion, bringing a level of homogeneity to its exposures.  But it can also be used by the cedent as a further underwrit-
ing tool, whereby it retains a much smaller share of undesirable risks.  To this extent, a surplus share agreement al-
lows for some  degree of anti-selection.  Obviously this opportunity cannot be abused or  the reinsurance  facility
might disappear on renewal.
Ceding Commissions are common in reinsurance.  In proportional reinsurance agreements,  a reinsurer of-
ten will agree to split the net premium (as opposed to the gross premium) and losses according to a fixed percentage
basis.  The net premium has removed from it the marketing, administrative, and sales commission costs as well as
premium taxes incurred by the primary carrier in writing the policy. In this way the primary carrier is reimbursed for
its additional costs.  Other adjustments may be made, as discussed in the Prices and Usage section.
Nonproportional  Reinsurance
Nonproportional reinsurance contracts have also been known for a long time, but these forms of reinsurance
became widely used only after World War II.  The two most common forms include excess of loss contracts, which
are the oldest nonproportional reinsurance contracts, and stop loss contracts. Below we describe each.
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to some maximum amount.  If losses exceed that amount, the entire excess will be paid by the reinsurer, up to the
limits of the contract.  Excess of loss contracts are sometimes purchased in layers.  In this arrangement,  a primary
carrier may purchase reinsurance from several reinsurers, with each of the reinsurers obligated to assume a particular
layer of losses.  Then when a claim comes due, the reinsurers respond in a predetermined order until  the total loss is
covered.  Through layering, the primary carrier may secure the type and amount of reinsurance protection desired, and
not be restricted to the willingness of a single reinsurer to provide it.
Stop  loss contracts are similar to excess of loss contracts, except that stop loss contracts apply to a portfo-
lio of insurance contracts.  This kind of contract is simple to administer and in some sense better meets the needs of
most insurers, because it is the total of all losses that is typically of greater concern, not the loss payments  under a
single contract.  Stop loss contracts are used by the newly established company and by subsidiaries from a foreign
parent company.  Such a company may have a quota share treaty as its first line of defense against major claims
problems.  Using this part of their reinsurance package, it could protect itself against the probability of a single very
large claim.  However, it remains exposed to the risk that the number of claims would become excessive.  It is just
as bad for an insurer to have to pay  10 claims of $100,000 each  as it is to pay one claim of $1 million.  This is
where stop loss contracts, as a supplement to quota share treaties, can be most helpful.  For certain lines of busi-
ness, such as hail insurance or extended warranty, variance in severity is not a problem.  However, significant vari-
ance in frequency can easily overwhelm an insurer.  The stop loss contract is the only effective  way of providing
reinsurance protection in these cases.  If the treaty is at arm's  length, then many conditions will apply.4
Hybrid  Contracts
Reinsurance  contracts that involve some combination of proportional  and  nonproportional reinsurance  are
known as hybrid contracts.  For example, a reinsurer may accept liability for losses exceeding some threshold, but
only up to some upper limit.  Beyond that upper limit, the reinsurer may pay a proportion of further losses, or in-
deed nothing at all.  Alternatively, a reinsurance contract may provide for reinsurance payments to begin if losses ex-
ceed some threshold, but where the reinsurer may pay only a portion of losses above that threshold, but without an
upper limit on total losses.  Numerous other arrangements are made, but most are some variation on these themes.
Retrocessions
Reinsurers  face risks similar to that of primary carriers.  They too have limited capacity to retain risks and
prefer to achieve a balance in the portfolio of risks that they do retain.  Accordingly,  reinsurers often seek to buy
reinsurance  from  other reinsurers.  Such reinsurance  is known as retrocessions.  By utilizing this  vehicle,  the
risks can be spread among a large enough group of insurers and reinsurers that a single catastrophe or a series of large
losses can be absorbed better without causing insolvencies among the risk carriers.  The same proportional and non-
proportional forms of contracts described above are used for retrocessions.
An alternative to retrocessions for reinsurers, and perhaps even primary carriers, is to hedge their risk in the
newly established insurance futures markets at the Chicago Board of Trade Exchange.  While  dealing in exchange
traded insurance and catastrophe futures eliminates the counterparty risk that prevails in retrocession arrangements, it
does introduce "basis risk" because the risk covered in the futures contracts, based on some aggregate index, may not
correspond to a given company's pattern of exposure.
Prices and  Usage
All proportional reinsurance is negotiated in terms of the ceding commission.  Typically, the ceding commis-
sion is at a flat  rate, at approximately  the level of internal expenses of the cedent.  Then, the reinsurer is said to
"follow the fortunes"  of the ceding company.  Both will make profits or losses in proportion to each company's
share. 5 However, many proportional treaties now contain some sort of sliding scale commission, pegged to the loss
ratio under the treaty.  In many cases, this allows for a better fine-tuning of the treaty, providing more protection as
the loss ratio increases.  In extreme cases, the ceding commission will vary on a one-to-one basis over a very broad
41n the late 1980's, a North American  insurance  company  had obtained  a stop loss cover at such a low level that it
was guaranteed  profits no matter how bad the business was. The reinsurer  claimed  that the cover was obtained by
fraudulent  means  and refused to pay on all its treaties. Cardinal  had to be liquidated.
51n some sense, the ceding commission  serves as a pricing mechanism  in proportional  reinsurance. On good busi-
ness, the ceding company  will expect a larger ceding commission  than its acquisition  expenses. On bad business,
the reinsurer  will offer less.
- Page 6 -range. This has the effect of providing an almost certain profit to the reinsurer and no effective protection to the ced-
ing insurer.
For excess of loss treaties, the cost is negotiated directly, as the rate based on some measure of exposure, usu-
ally direct premiums.  For low level excess treaties (known as working covers), some losses are expected to affect
the layer each year.  Therefore, minimum and maximum rates are specified along with a formula that determines the
rate between the two extremes.  If no losses reach the layer, the minimum rate applies; if many losses  occur, the
maximum rate applies.  In addition, or as an alternative, an aggregate deductible may apply.  The ceding company
must analyze the cost of its reinsurance protection, the effectiveness of this protection, and the balance between too
little and too much reinsurance.
Stop  loss treaties are not very common, and automatic facultative treaties are rare in the property/casualty
business.  These unusual types of treaties may be effective in special circumstances, but the most common treaties
are proportional and per occurrence excess treaties.  For normal casualty lines, small companies will combine quota
share treaties (to increase the number of exposures) with per occurrence excess treaties in various layers.  Large com-
panies will forego the quota share treaties.  For property insurance, surplus share treaties and catastrophe covers are
the usual ones.
ECONOMICS  OF  RISK  TRANSFER
In some sense, reinsurance can be thought of as renting capital.  In this section we show through the use of
diagrams how risk can be transferred to an insurer or reinsurer. We begin by considering the case of simple insurance
contract designs.  Then we introduce reinsurance to show how the risk covered under an insurance contract can be
shared by the ceding company and the reinsurer.
We should note at the outset that the economics of risk transfer have been examined rigorously by a number
of leading actuaries and economists. Three basic conclusions of this research are:
I  )  The form of reinsurance contract that will give the greatest reduction of the variance in the aggregate claim
distribution  of the ceding company, for a given net premium, is the stop loss contract.  (See Karl Borch
[19601, Paul Kahn [1961], and Jan Ohlin [1969].)
2)  A proportional contract will give the reinsurer the smallest variance in aggregate claim distribution for a
fixed net premium. (See S. Vajda [1962].)
3)  Because there are at least two parties to any reinsurance arrangement, and a treaty can be called optimal
only if all parties consider it as the best possible arrangement, the compromise  reinsurance arrangement
should be something between the stop loss and the proportional contracts.  (See K. Borch [1974, Part 2].)
These conclusions can be narrowed if specific information is known about the risk aversion of the parties to a
reinsurance agreement.  If only general information is available regarding their risk aversion, then the methods of
stochastic dominance can be used to determine which contract parameters are preferred.  (See D. Babbel and A. Hogan
[19921 for an application of the economics of stochastic dominance to the problem of insurance.)
Loss Coverage for  Types of  Insurance
Insurance coverage relative to losses can be displayed simply with diagrams.  On the horizontal axis we show
losses and on the vertical axis we show coverage levels.  For the moment, let us ignore the sharing of risks between
a reinsurer and a primary carrier, and focus our attention solely on the insurance coverage of losses.  Because such a
wide variety of  reinsurance  contracts exists,  it would be  impractical to discuss  here all of their  variations  here.
Differences in negotiated terms, premiums and limits are myriad.  However, most contracts have some elements in
common with the contracts described in this section.
On the page that follows we present a diagram of full insurance coverage against all losses.  The amount of
coverage provided by the insurer, for any given loss, is shown by the vertical distance in the lightly shaded area.
Whenever full coverage is obtained, it can be represented by a 450 line.  For example, if a loss of $1,000 occurs and
the insurer pays the full amount of the loss, it can be represented as a point on the 45° line.




A situation in which there is full coverage beyond a deductible of, say, $200, can be represented by the dia-
gram below.  A fixed deductible has the effect of shifting the coverage line downward  by the amount of the de-
ductible, yet it remains parallel to the full coverage line.  If the insured suffers a loss of $1,000, the insurer indemni-
fies the insured for $800.




-Page  8  -A contract  which provides 80% coverage of any given loss could be represented by the diagram shown below.
In the case of a $1,000 loss, the insurer indemnifies the policyholder with $800.  Note that the angle of the coverage
line is less than that of the full coverage line.  In the diagram, the angle is 360, which is 80% of 45°.





Finally, we show an insurance contract that provides 80% coverage above a deductible of $200.  In our exam-
pie of a $1,000 loss, this would provide $640 of coverage to the insured.  Note that the coverage line has shifted to
the right by $200, yet the 360 angle is maintained.
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Next, we consider reinsurance contracts.  The underlying insurance policy features full coverage beyond a de-
ductible, but it is a straightforward adjustment to render the diagrams suitable for other kinds of underlying coverage
profiles.  We examine first the insurance and reinsurance coverage on a simple proportional reinsurance contract of-













-Page  10-Next, we show a situation where the cedent retains $600 of exposure beyond a deductible of $200, but where
the  reinsurer assumes  only 50% of the  loss exposure above  that level.  Thus, with a loss of  $1,000,  the cedent
would pay $700 while the reinsurer would be responsible for $100 of the loss.










In the next example, we turn our attention to an excess of loss reinsurance contract featuring full coverage be-
yond the cedent's  retention level, but only to an upper limit.  In our example, the insured is responsible for absorb-
ing the first $200 of loss; the primary carrier covers the next $600 in losses; the reinsurer covers the next $625 of
losses; and the primary carrier absorbs anything above $1,425 in losses.
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tention of $700.  Note that above that retention, the cedent is also responsible for 40% of losses beyond their reten-
tion limit, and for all losses above $1,425, after the upper limit of the reinsurer has been reached.












. .....  E  i  Portion
$1,000  Loss
The reader  familiar  with  derivative  financial  instruments  will immediately  see a parallel  between  reinsurance
contracts  and options. For example,  stop loss reinsurance  can be modeled  in an option  framework  as a call option;
pro rata reinsurance  above a retention  can be modeled  as half an option (if the proportion  of coverage  is 1/2); stop
loss with an upper limit is a vertical spread  for the reinsurer,  involving a long position in a protective  put plus a
short position  in an out-of-the-money  call. The option  framework  is particularly  helpful in examining  the  insurer's
incentive  to increase  volatility 6 of the underlying  insurance  portfolio,  to delay  loss payments  (even if the eventual
settlement  amount  is much higher),  and to view the impact  of inflation  on the "strike  price"  - which in the  reinsur-
ance case is the retention level.
CHARACTERISTICS  OF  REINSURANCE  RISK
The characteristics  of reinsurance  risk are related  directly  to the form  of reinsurance  contract. In proportional
reinsurance  contracts,  the reinsurers  share the same  risks as the primary  carriers;  thus, there is nothing  unique  about
the risk characteristics  absorbed  by reinsurers  relative  to that retained  by the primary  carriers.
In nonproportional  reinsurance  contracts,  however, it is generally  the case that the reinsurer's risk differs
markedly  from that retained  by the primary  carrier. This stems  from the structure  of the contract. With most non-
proportional  reinsurance,  there is much uncertainty  surrounding  the risks transferred  to reinsurers.  Such risks  are
generally  characterized  by low claims  frequency  and  high loss severity;  moreover,  neither  the frequency  nor  severity
of losses are very predictable. Another  aspect  of reinsurance  that makes it particularly  troublesome  is the  long time
it takes  before the nature  of the reinsurer's liability  is made manifest. This  is particularly  true of stop loss contracts,
which  only begin  payments  after the primary  carrier  has exhausted  its retention.  The problem  is exacerbated  with  the
"long tail" lines of coverage,  where  the losses take the longest  to fully  develop. Credible  loss data needed  to project
61n a limited company, the shareholders  can lose no more than the equity. However,  the potential  for profit can be
almost unlimited  if the shareholders  are willing  to accept  more  risk (i.e., more  variance). This asymmetry  of
risks/rewards  is readily  apparent  in the options framework  of analysis  and sometimes  give rise to a behavior
known  as "betting  the company." For claimants,  however,  the upside  is limited  by the amount  of their claims,
while  the downside  can be much  greater  than  the shareholders'  equity.  Because  of the significant  difference  between
the two,  the role  of the regulator  becomes  very  important  to limit  the risks  and preserve  solvency.
- Page 12 -future losses may be unavailable or scanty, and the reinsurer must depend much more on professional judgment and
experience to evaluate the nature of an exposure.
Many insurance policies are written on an "occurrence" basis, rather than a "claims made" basis, particularly
in the liability  lines.  With  these kinds of underlying  policies, claims may  be filed years after  a policy  expires.
Reinsurers are also subject to more reporting delays than primary carriers.  The reason for this is that with excess of
loss and stop loss contracts, if the primary carrier's  reserves are set within its retention, no notification may be given
to the reinsurer of claims that have been filed.  But when the claims are ultimately paid, the retention may be ex-
ceeded.  It is only at that time, which can be years later in some cases, that the reinsurer is notified.
Another characteristic of reinsurance risk is that it is susceptible to inflation impact.  Because the reinsurance
portion of coverage is often paid last, it is far more subject to the impact of inflation on repair costs, litigation, and
wages than is the primary carrier's  portion of coverage, which is paid much sooner.  The impact of inflation on rein-
surers may be exacerbated where the reinsurer has no capped retention limits.  When inflation is severe, reinsurers
will require the use of an inflation clause, designed to allocate the impact of inflation more fairly among the contract-
ing parties.
Below we show US industry average loss development patterns for general liability and automobile liability
business lines.  Notice that in both cases, much more of the ultimate loss is paid sooner by primary  carriers vs.
reinsurers.  This is particularly pronounced with general liability insurance.  As the exhibit below reveals, after four
development years reinsurers have paid only 39% of their total ultimate loss, whereas primary carriers have paid over
two-thirds of theirs.  Ten years after a loss has occurred, reinsurers will have paid only two-thirds of their total ulti-
mate loss, whereas primary carriers will have paid over nine-tenths of theirs.  Thus, the reinsurer is subject to more
claims inflation and uncertainties devolving from changing economic and social/legal conditions than is the primary
carrier.  Moreover, there is a wide range of experience surrounding these industry averages, that varies by reinsurer
and also by year.
Primary  vs. Reinsurer  Historical  Loss  Development:











Sources:  A.M. Best  Company  for  primary  carriers,  Reinsurance  Institute  of  America  for reinsurers
In the case of  automobile liability, the disparity in payment  patterns is similar  to that in general  liability
lines, but less pronounced. As the exhibit on the next page reveals, after four development years reinsurers have paid
only 80% of their  total ultimate  loss, whereas primary  carriers  have paid over 97 percent of theirs.  Ten years after a
- Page l13  -loss has occurred, reinsurers will have paid 91 percent of their total ultimate loss, whereas primary carriers will have
paid 99.7 percent of theirs.  The reinsurer is therefore again subject to more claims inflation and uncertainties from
changing economic and social/legal conditions than is the primary carrier.
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Sources:  A.M. Best Company  for  primary  carriers;  Reinsurance  Institute  of America  for reinsurers
REINSURANCE  MARKET
In its broadest sense, the reinsurance market would include the following:
1) Reinsurance treaties:  transfer of risks to another insurer
2)  Internal pools:  sharing of risks among affiliated insurers
3)  Industry pools:  sharing of difficult risks (e.g., nuclear) among a large number of participants
4)  Non-voluntary pools:  required sharing of high risk business among all licensed insurers based on market
share
5)  Lloyds system: insurance with syndicates of independent individuals
6)  Reciprocal insurance exchanges:  mutual sharing of risks by participating entities
Much of the reinsurance coverage is available through German and Swiss reinsurers.  Also, there are some
large reinsurers located in America, France, Sweden, and Japan, while a few other key players in the reinsurance mar-
ket are scattered about.  Reinsurance can be obtained from professional domestic insurers, located in the countries of
their respective clients, from reinsurance departments of primary carriers, and from foreign-based reinsurers located
outside of the client's  country.  Reinsurance may be purchased directly from the reinsurer, or through a broker or
other insurance intermediary, or through an insurance exchange, such as the ones at Rotterdam and Chicago.  The ad-
vantage of going through a broker is that some of the large brokerage firms will provide advisory services about the
nature of contract, the quality of the reinsurer, and will help negotiate the most favorable price for the contract de-
sired.  However, they do charge for their services, and some brokers do not offer and are not capable of offering these
services.  Rather, they act merely as an intermediary for a handful of companies with which they conduct virtually all
of their business.  Also, certain reinsurers, such as Swiss Re, routinely provide training services for their clients on
- Page 14 -topics ranging from underwriting, claims reserving and handling, investments, and even general management.  They
view an educated client as a good client, and frequently run special seminars that are intended to enhance the profes-
sionalism in the industry.
The largest reinsurers operating in the US at the end of 1993, based on policyholder net equity, were General
Reinsurance  ($3.8 billion),  Employers  Reinsurance  ($1.6 billion),  American Reinsurance  ($1.1  billion), Munich
Reinsurance ($0.7 billion), and North American/Swiss Reinsurance ($0.7 billion).  The total net equity for reinsurers
exceeded $27 billion for that year.  At the other extreme, there are numerous reinsurers who have almost no capital,
and whose creditworthiness  is very low.  Many of these companies do not last through a business cycle, and  are
likely to become insolvent in the near term.  Indeed, two of three insurance exchanges (New York, Miami) got into
severe financial difficulties during the late 1980s  and were closed.
In terms of the volume of net written premium, the largest reinsurers during 1992 are shown below.  (Figures
are given in U$ billions).
Rank  Group or Company  Net Premium  Rank  Group or Company  Net Premium
Written  . Written
I  Munich Re (Germany)  8,935  15  American Re (USA)  1,020
2  Swiss Reinsurance  7,196  16  Winterthur Group (Switzerland)  820
(Switzerland)
3  Employers Re (USA)  3,101  17  Zurich Group (Switzerland)  798
4  Cologne Re (Germany)  2,362  18  Prudential Re (USA)  797
5  General Reinsurance (USA)  2,348  19  Toa Fire & Marine (Japan)  731
6  Hannover Ruck &  2,205  20  Yasuda Fire & Marine (Japan)  685
Eisen U Stahl (Germany)
7  Assicurazioni Generali  1,827  21  National Indemnity Co (USA)  677
(Italy)
8  Gerling Globale Re Group  1,709  22  Axa Reassurances (France)  668
(Germany)
9  Lincoln National Group  1,662  23  Aachener Ruck Group  627
(USA)  (Germany)
10  Frankona Ruck (Germany)  1,588  24  Cigna Group (USA)  582
11  Mercantile & General Re  1,548  25  SA Francaise de Reassurance  564
(UK)  (France)
12  Scor SA Group (France)  1,533  26  Kemper Re (USA)  559
13  Tokio Marine & Fire  1,211  27  Mitsui Marine & Fire  539
(Japan)  (Japan)
14  Skandia International  1,156  28  Uni-Storebrand Int'l Group  520
(Sweden)  (Norway)
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Rules  Applying  to  Cession
In any jurisdiction that has introduced a supervisory system for insurance, particularly one that has adopted a
"solvency monitoring" approach, special attention must be given to the use of reinsurance and to the identity and fi-
nancial strength of reinsurance companies receiving business from domestic companies.
When a company has reinsured a significant proportion of its business to a particular reinsurer, its financial
strength can be said to depend on the strength of that reinsurer.  In some cases, companies cede more than 50% of
their business to a reinsurer and thus their basic survival depends entirely on the capacity and willingness of the rein-
surer to honor any claims as they are presented and to do so in a timely fashion.  In a number of cases where insur-
ance company failures have occurred in North America, the cause of failure has been traced to unsound reinsurance of
the company's  business.
Regulators must address the following aspects when considering the soundness of the reinsurance practices
adopted by the companies they supervise:
I . Proportion of business that is retained by the direct writing company.  While it is quite appropriate for a
company to cede a major portion, even 100% of certain risks that it accepts, the company should retain
for its own account a reasonable proportion of its total premium receipts.  It is recommended that this
minimum retention level be set at 25% or higher.7 Regulators may choose to allow new companies to
retain a smaller proportion in the first few years of operation but they should steadily raise the retention
to the 25% level.  If a company proposes to retain a lesser percentage, it is seeking to operate as a broker
and not as an insurer.
2.  Proportion of business that is ceded to unlicensed companies.  For a variety of reasons, including cost of
reinsurance, companies are frequently inclined to cede business to reinsurers that have not chosen to ob-
tain a license to operate in the jurisdiction.  The regulator may be faced with a problem in that it may be
quite difficult to obtain information concerning  the reinsurance company and its financial strength and
there may also be a concern over the ability to enforce payment of claims in the event the regulator  is
obliged to assume control of the licensed direct-writing company.  On the other hand, it cannot be pre-
sumed that all reinsurance ceded to unlicensed companies is unreliable.  In fact, some of the largest and
strongest reinsurance companies in the world solicit business actively in many countries where they are
not licensed.  There may be valid practical impediments to such licensing.  The following approaches
may be adopted by regulators in respect of cessions to unlicensed reinsurers:
a)  Impose  a maximum percentage  of total company premiums that may be ceded  to unlicensed
companies (such as 25%)
b)  Require licensed companies to file with the regulator financial statements and other pertinent in-
formation about such unlicensed reinsurers
The regulator could enforce these provisions by refusing to recognize the reinsurance in its calculation for
the test of the domestic insurer's capital adequacy for any cessions that exceed the 25% level or whenever
the information filed with the regulator fails to demonstrate that the reinsurer has the desired level of fi-
nancial strength.
3.  Dealings with reinsurance brokers. In many cases, companies arrange reinsurance through  private brokers
who act as agents for a reinsurance company or a pool of such companies.  Such arrangements can pose
problems for the regulator when information regarding the identity and financial strength of the reinsur-
ance companies that will actually be on the risk is lacking.  In such cases, the reinsurance may actually
be placed outside the country with reinsurers who may not be licensed in the country.  In order to deal
with such cases, the regulator should require the local company to obtain complete informnation  on the
reinsurance companies that ultimately wind up on the risk for the business ceded.  Subsequently the regu-
lator will deal with the business as noted in points  I and 2 above.  We have encountered situations where
7Note:  Retention  rates among the developed  countries  average  in excess of 80%. See Sigma, Economic  Study No.
5194,  Swiss Reinsurance Company.
- Page 16 -companies have not been informed by the brokers of the minimum details on the cession - not even the
identity of the reinsurers.  This should not be tolerated as the direct-writing company would be forced to
rely on the integrity and financial resources of the broker to handle a claim.  Often such brokers would
not be in a position to pay the claims.
In some jurisdictions, there has been a concern over the loss of limited foreign reserves that occurs when reinsurance
premiums are paid to carriers outside the country.  In order to stem this tide, certain jurisdictions have created domes-
tic reinsurance companies and occasionally mandated that domestic direct-writing companies cede a minimum propor-
tion of their business to these reinsurers.  In the majority of cases, these reinsurers have not proven to be success-
ful.  These companies often lack the kind of expertise that is usually found among the ranks of the employees of the
major international reinsurance organizations and can contribute little to the underwriting and development of insur-
ance in the local market.  Despite this lack of expertise, such companies usually collect a uniform percentage of all
the premiums written by local insurance companies, forcing companies to reinsure some business that they would
have preferred to retain for their own account and also accepting as reinsured coverage some risks that the reinsurer
may lack the capital to support.
When policy-makers  in a country are concerned over the matter of reinsurance premium  flows leaving the
country, it may be possible to engineer a reciprocal agreement with the major international reinsurers whereby they
cede other business, perhaps originating in other countries, back to the local companies in an amount that would re-
place some if not all of the premium revenue that is paid to them and is perceived to be "lost" by the local company
(and, by extension, by the local economy).  This arrangement may be impractical if the local reinsurers do not have
the capacity, nor the technical ability, to take on retrocession from other countries.8 Moreover, the lack of foreign
exchange capital to cover losses may be just  as important to the underlying project economics when international
reinsurance is denied.  Some countries do not seem to grasp in trying to save "premiums" for the local economy that
the more important issue is whether they can afford the losses that might occur.  Another alternative would include
asking foreign reinsurers to invest some portion of their premiums in local assets, providing that the economic situ-
ation in the ceding country is conducive to such investment.  This probably is not practical for most countries.
Rules Applying to the  Activities of the  Reinsurer
In most countries, licensing of reinsurers is subject to the same standards and criteria that apply to the li-
censing of direct writers, although initial capital requirements may be somewhat higher, and more time may be al-
lowed for filing annual returns.  All insurance companies, including reinsurers, establish their capacity for accepting
risk using actuarial principles that measure exposure to risk against the company's capital.  The identification of the
size and nature of risk that a company is prepared to undertake, and the risk weights it assigns to those undertakings,
vary by product line and many other considerations, including perhaps territory and currency.  Once these matters
have been determined, each company will then fix its maximum retention for a given risk in light of available capi-
tal.  Any amounts of business that it chooses to accept ("underwrite" in insurance jargon)  that involve exposures in
excess of the maximum retention must be ceded or retroceded to another company.
Owing to the complexity of this process, only very few regulators have attempted to set statutory limits on
maximum retention for either insurers or reinsurers.  In a supervisory system that depends on monitoring  of sol-
vency as opposed to strict regulatory controls on operations, such retention limits would have no place.  It is un-
likely that the regulator would be better equipped to fix the retention limits than would the insurance company man-
agers.
In order to provide effective assistance to the direct-writing companies, reinsurers will normally set higher
retention limits for the risks they undertake than would a direct-writing company.  By extension of the process just
described, this implies a need for greater amounts of capital.
In Canada, a company may choose to be authorized to carry on reinsurance only.  In such a case, the appli-
cant would be expected to provide financial statements and forecasts to indicate that the capital it proposes to invest
in the Canadian operation will be sufficient under reasonable scenarios to support the reinsurance business of the
company for a number of years into the future.  It is interesting to note that a company receiving a license to operate
81n the early 1980's, some countries  in Southeast  Asia thought  it was a good idea to encourage  their local compa-
nies to seek reinsurance  abroad. The basic idea was  to balance  the outflow  of ceded reinsurance  with the inflow of
reinsurance  assumptions. However,  these  companies  were perceived  as "naive capacity" and ended up on the worst
treaties.  Consequently,  this resulted in a net outflow of claims payments over premium income, and only made
matters worse.
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quence of licensing for reinsurance exclusively is the ability to delay periodic filings with the regulators to allow the
reinsurer time to gather necessary statistics from its client companies.
In Uruguay, for example, if a reinsurer seeks to underwrite business it must obtain special authority to do
so.  The minimum capital required is defined to be  10 times the minimum capital for a direct writing company that
would seek to do only one line of business.  This 10-times rule is applied, no matter how many lines of business
the reinsurer proposes to write.
Regulation and Contracts of  "Utmost Good Faith"
Reinsurance has a very long tradition.  In its origins it was described as a "gentleman's  agreement" done in
utmost good faith.  Reinsurance agreements were seldom committed to writing and there was rarely any dispute from
the reinsurer when a direct writer presented a legitimate claim for payment.  This poses considerable difficulty for a
regulator.  Without a written contract, it is impossible to verify the terms of the reinsurance.
In times of company failure, this has proven to be a very serious problem.  When a direct writer fails, the
reinsurers have every reason to want to question each and every detail of every claim that is presented to them for
payment.  The client company will produce no more new business and no new revenue for them and consequently,
the reinsurers will not be interested in paying claims that are the least bit questionable.  Instead of settling in utmost
good faith, the reinsurer will require strict compliance to the letter of the reinsurance agreement and is also likely to
want to be satisfied that the insurer applied and maintained sound underwriting standards when it placed business in
the first place.  Regulators and liquidators who have been faced with this situation have often been forced to accept
compromise settlements on claims that would likely have been paid at their full value by a reinsurer that was dealing
with a client company in good financial health.
For this reason, regulators are insisting that reinsurance treaties be committed to writing.  The practice, at
least in North America, is to renew reinsurance treaties at the end of the calendar year, with terms to be applicable for
all business ceded during the following year.  Because of the volume of negotiations that take place, there is often a
delay in producing final  written agreements.  However, cover notes should be obtained immediately and must be
signed by the reinsurer, not the reinsurance intermediary.  The regulator should press for their execution as soon as
possible.
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alien reinsurers:  reinsurers  located outside of the domestic country and not licensed domestically
assuming  insurer:  see reinsurer  (synonym)
automatic  facultative  agreements:  a  treaty under which the primary  carrier  has the  option to cede  and  the
reinsurer has the option to accept or decline risks within a specific business line conforming to the contract
capacity:  a measure, in monetary terms, of the amount of risk an insurer can prudently assume  based on its  net
equity and the nature of the business written
catastrophe  covers:  excess of  loss coverage  designed to protect the ceding company on an  occurrence  basis
against an accumulation of property and liability losses
ceding commission:  a reimbursement from the reinsurer to the ceding company for expenses, such as marketing
costs and sales commissions associated with acquiring the business being reinsured
cedent; ceding  insurer:  the insurance company that is purchasing reinsurance
cession:  the amount of insurance coverage ceded to a reinsurer by a primary carrier
clash covers:  excess of loss coverage designed to protect the ceding company on an occurrence basis against an
accumulation of casualty losses
credit  for reinsurance:  a provision of  statutory accounting enabling  a ceding company to treat as assets or re-
ductions in liabilities the amounts due from recognized reinsurers
direct underwriter:  see ceding insurer (synonym)
excess  of  loss reinsurance:  a contract whereby  the reinsurer agrees to be liable for all losses exceeding a cer-
tain amount on policies of a given class of business during a specific period.
facultative  reinsurance:  reinsurance contracts that cover individual underlying policies and are written on a pol-
icy-specific basis, often used to cover catastrophic, very large, or unusual risk exposures
layering:  the use of two or more reinsurance agreements to obtain a desired level of coverage; when losses occur,
the reinsurers respond in a predetermined sequence, as necessary, to cover the loss
net equity:  the combination of paid  in capital, shareholders'  surplus, policyholders'  surplus, subordinated  debt,
and surplus notes, which serves as an important buffer to cover claims beyond those provided for in the insurance re-
serves
primary carrier:  see ceding insurer (synonym)
professional  domestic  reinsurers:  reinsurers  located in the domestic country whose principal business is the
assumption of reinsurance from insurance companies
proportional  reinsurance:  reinsurance whereby all premiums, losses and expenses are shared on a prorata basis
between the ceding and assuming insurers
quota share:  a type of proportional reinsurance that indemnifies the ceding company for a specified percentage of
loss on each risk covered in the agreement, in return for receipt of a similar percentage of net premium paid to the
ceding company
reinsurance contract:  a transaction in which one insurance company indemnifies, for a premium, another insur-
ance company against all or part of the loss that it may sustain under its policy or policies of insurance.
- Page 19 -reinsurance  departments:  a department of a primary carrier that reinsures contracts written by other insurance
companies
reinsurer:  the company that specializes in underwriting reinsurance; company that accepts reinsurance
retention:  the amount of insurance retained by the ceding company for its own account; a term used in connection
with excess of loss reinsurance wherein the reinsurer is responsible for reimbursing the ceding company for losses in
excess of the level of retention specified in the reinsurance contract
retrocession:  process by which a reinsurer obtains reinsurance from another company
surplus:  a term used in the insurance industry to denote the amount by which the assets of an insurer exceed its li-
abilities;  see also net equity
surplus  relief  reinsurance:  a form of reinsurance  in which little or no insurance risk is transferred  yet an en-
hancement to net equity is shown on the books of the ceding insurer
surplus  share:  a form of proportional  reinsurance wherein the ceding company cedes the portion of its liability
that exceeds its net retention, in return for which the assuming reinsurer receives a similar portion of the total pre-
mium
treaty  reinsurance:  a broad reinsurance agreement covering some portion of a particular class or classes of busi-
ness; reinsurance treaties automatically cover all risks written by the insured that fall within their terms unless they
specifically exclude exposures
- Page 20 -REFERENCES
American  Society of Certified Property  and Casualty Underwriters. Principles of Reinsurance,  Volumes I  and 2,
1990, telephone 610-644-2100.
David F.. Babbel and Arthur Hogan, "Incentive Conflicts and Portfolio Choice in the Insurance Industry," Journal of
Risk and Insuiranice,  Vol. 59. No. 4,  1992, pp. 645-654.
Karl Borch. "An Attempt to Determine the Optimum Amount of Stop Loss Reinsurance," Tratisactions of the XVI
Internzational  Congress of Actuaries,  1960, Vol. 1, pp. 597-610.  Also reprinted as Chapter I in K. Borch [1974].
Karl  Borch,  The Mathematical  Theory  of Insurance,  Lexington  Books,  1974.
Paul M. Kahn, "Some Remarks on a recent Paper by Borch," ASTIN Bulletin, Vol. 1, 1961. pp. 265-272.
C. Mishra  and Jorge L. Urrutia.  "An Option-Based Approach to Determining the Optimal Reinsurance  Stop-Loss
Premium,"  Advances  in Futures  and  Options  Research,  Volume  7, pp. 313-321,  1994.
NAC  Reinsurance  Corporation,  Reinsurance  Contracts:  Content  and  Regulation,  2n,d edition,  1993, One Greenwich
Plaza, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836.
Jan Ohlin. "A Generalization of a Result by Borch and Kahn on the Optimal Properties of Stop Loss Reinsurance,"
ASTIN  Bulletin,  Vol. 5,  1969. pp.  249-266.
Reinsurance  Association  of  America,  Fundamentals  of Property-Casualty  Reinsurance,  1994. telephone  202-638-
3690.
Reinsurance Association of America, Glossar) of Reinsurance Ternms, 1994, telephone 202-638-3690.
Reinsurance Association of America, Historical Loss Development Studv,  telephone 202-638-3690.
Reinsurance  Association  of America,  Reinsurance  and  Insurance  Industry  Solvency:  Questions,  Answers  and  Policy
Reco.nnmendations,  1992, telephone 202-638-3690.
Reinsurance  Association  of America,  Reinsurance  Undenvriting  Review:  1993 Premiums  anid Losses  and  Operating
Results,  1994, telephone 202-638-3690.
Reinsurance  Association  of  America,  The  U.S.  Reinsurance  Market  in  1992:  An  Analysis  of Annual  Statement
Data,  1994, telephone 202-638-3690.
George  Rejda.  Principles  of  Risk  Management  and  Insurance,  4th  edition,  1992,  chapter  25,  Harper  Collins
Publishers.
J. Stone, "A Theory of Capacity (Part 1)," Journal of Risk and Insuranice,  Vol. 40. No. 2 (June 1973), pp. 231-243.
J. Stone, "A Theory of Capacity and the Insurance of Catastrophe Risks (Part II)," Journal of Risk and Insurance,
Vol. 40, No. 3 (September  1973), pp. 339-355.
Robert Strain, editor, Reinsurance. 4th ed, 1980, Strain Publishing, telephone 914-832-9384.
Robert W. Strain, editor, Reinsurance Contract Wording, 1992,  Strain Publishing, Athens, Texas
Swiss  Reinsurance  Company,  "Reinsurance  1992:  A Stocktaking of Ten Countries,"  Sigma.  Economic  Studies
Section. P.O. Box 8022. Zurich.
James  Trieschmann  and  Sandra Gustavson. Risk Management  & Insurance,  9th edition,  South-Western  College
Publishing.  1995, chapter 22.
S. Vajda, "Minimum  Variance Reinsurance." ASTIN Bulletin, Vol. 2, 1962, pp. 257-260.
- Page 21 -Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1491  Equilibrium Incentives for Adopting  Peter W. Kennedy  August 1995  E. Schaper
Cleaner Technology Under Emissions  Benoit Laplante  33457
Pricing
WPS1492  Trade Policies. Macroeconomic  Sarath Rajapatirana  August 1995  J. Troncoso
Adjustment, and Manufactured  37826
Exports: The Latin American Experience
WPS1493  Migration and the Skill Composition  Ram6n Lopez  August 1995  J. Ngaine
of the Labor Force: The Impact  Maurice Schiff  37947
of Trade Liberalization in Developing
Countries
WPS1494  Adjustment and Poverty in Mexican  Ramon Lopez  August 1995  J. Ngaine
Agriculture: How Farmers' Wealth  John Nash  37947
Affects  Supply Response  Julie Stanton
WPS1495  Raising Household Energy Prices  Caroline L. Freund  August 1995  G. Langton
in Poland: Who Gains? Who Loses?  Christine I. Wallich  38392
WPS1496  Reviving Project Appraisal at the  Shantayanan Devarajan  August 1995  C. Bernardo
World Bank  Lyn Squire  37699
Sethaput Suthiwart-Narueput
WPS1497  Public Choices between Lifesaving  Maureen L. Cropper  August  1995  A. Maranon
Programs: How Inportant are Lives  Uma Subramanian  39074
Saved?
WPS1498  Decentralized Rural Development  Johan van Zyl  August 1995  M. Williams
and Enhanced Community  Tulio Barbosa  87297
Participation: A Case Study from  Andrew N. Parker
Northeast Brazil  Loretta Sonn
WPS1499  The Dynamics of Poverty: Why Some  Christiaan Grootaert  August 1995  A. Sachdeva
People Escape from Poverty and  Ravi Kanbur  82717
Others Don't-An  African Case  Gi-Taik Oh
Study
WPS1500  Agricultural Trade Liberalization in  Merlinda D. lngco  August 1995  J. Ngaine
the Uruguay Round: One Step Forward,  37947
One Step Back?
WPS  1501 Are Partner-Country Statistics Useful  Alexander J. Yeats  August 1995  J. Ngaine
for Estimating "Missing" Trade Data?  37947
WPS1502  Active Labor Market Policies in the  Hartmut Lehmann  August 1995  WDR
OECD and in Selected Transition  31393
EconomiesPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1503  Africa's  Growth  Tragedy:  A  William  Easterly  August 1995  R_  Martin
Retrospective,  1960-89  Ross Levine  39120
WPS1504 Savings  and Education:  A Life-Cycle  Jacques  Morisset  August 1995  N. Cuellar
Model  Applied  to a Panel  of 74  Cesar  Revoredo  37892
Countries
WPS1505  The Cross-Section  of Stock Returns:  Stijn  Claessens  September  1995  M. Davis
Evidence  from Emerging  Markets  Susmita  Dasgupta  39620
Jack Glen
WPS1506 Restructuring  Regulation  of the Rail  loannis  N. Kessides  September  1995  J. Dytang
Industry  for the Public  Interest  Robert  D.  Willig  37161
WPS1507  Coping  with  Too  Much  of a Good  Morris  Goldstein  September  1995  R. Vo
Thing:  Policy  Responses  for Large  31047
Capital  Inflows  in Developing  Countries
WPS1508  Small  and Medium-Size  Enterprises  Sidney  G.  Winter  September  1995  D. Evans
in Economic  Development:  Possibilities  38526
for Research  and Policy
WPS1509  Saving  in Transition  Economies:  Patrick  Conway  September  1995  C. Bondarev
The  Summary  Report  33974
WPS1510  Hungary's  Bankruptcy  Experience,  Cheryl  Gray  September  1995  G. Evans
1992-93  Sabine Schlorke  37013
Miklos Szanyi
WPS1511  Default  Risk  and the Effective  David  F. Babbel  September  1995  S. Coca
Duration  of Bonds  Craig  Merrill  37474
William  Panning
WPS1512  The  World  Bank  Primer  on  Donald  A. Mclsaac  September  1995  P. Infante
Reinsurance  David  F. Babbel  37642